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Abstract. Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural
desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain,
respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights — which can
be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List
(2008) have generalised this result to the setting of binary judgement
aggregation. This paper proves that the liberal paradox holds even in
the framework of probabilistic opinion pooling and discusses options to
circumvent this impossibility result: restricting the aggregator domain
to profiles with no potential for conflicting rights, or considering agendas
whose issues are not all mutually interdependent.
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1. Introduction
Suppose expert A is a specialist for the treatment of some medical
condition α, while expert B specialises on therapies for condition β. Based on
substantial expertise, expert A asserts that a certain drug D cures patients
with the α diagnosis with probability 75±3%, while expert B testifies that
the chances for D to cure β patients are 63±4%. However, both experts A
and B agree that — for theoretical pharmacological reasons — D should be
more effective in the treatment of β than of α. If we accept the unanimous
theoretical testimony of both experts on the pharmacology of drug D, we
cannot also accept both of their empirical findings.
Unfortunately, this is not an exceptional case. Consider a panel of experts
each making probabilistic judgements about a given set of propositions,
according to their expertise. All of the experts have their specific areas
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of competence where they have superior expertise to their colleagues. Is it
possible to aggregate their probabilistic judgements in a way that preserves
unanimous agreement and follows each expert in her respective area of
competence? This paper shows that this is not generally possible — even if
one allows for full rationality of the experts (in the sense that they each have
a fully specified probability measure on the algebra of propositions under
consideration). We shall identify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions,
showing that the predicament in the above example is not exceptional. For
the case of binary preferential judgements this phenomenon is well-known
and commonly referred to as Sen’s [7] liberal paradox. For the case of general
binary judgements, Dietrich and List [2] have formulated and demonstrated
an analogue.
The last decade has seen the emergence of a new strand of literature on
general, logical aggregation problems, commonly referred to as judgement
aggregation (surveyed, e.g., by List and Puppe [4] and Mongin [6]). In
distinction from Arrow’s [1] classical theory of preference aggregation, this
new current of research investigates the aggregation of more general data,
such as sets of propositions in some formal logic.
One of the more recent developments is a unified approach to judgement
aggregation and probabilistic opinion pooling (in McConway’s [5] sense),
first proposed by Dietrich and List [3] and subsequently investigated by
other authors.
Now this kind of unification suggests a new set of research questions:
Which (im)possibility results from (preference and) judgement aggregation
theory possess an analogue in the framework of probabilistic pooling? The
present paper could also be regarded as a contribution to this line of research.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first propose a simplified
framework for probabilistic opinion pooling which can be seen as a natural
extension of judgement aggregation — with continuous rather than binary
truth values. In this simplified framework for probabilistic opinion pooling,
we formulate and prove an analogue of Sen’s liberal paradox.
2. Formal framework
To introduce the formal framework, let A be a Boolean algebra,
called agenda. We shall refer to the elements of A as propositions. Let
∆(A) be the set of all finitely-additive probability measures on A, called
complete probabilistic judgements. Let C be a subset of ∆(A), called the
set of admissible probability judgements; C can be viewed as encoding a
common background theory shared by the electorate (which may include
the requirement of σ-additivity for the individual probability measures). A
subset C′ ⊆ C is called cylindrical or generated by proposition-wise constraints
if and only if there is a subset B ⊆ A and some Γ : B → 2[0,1] such that C′
is the set of all P ∈ C satisfying P (A) ∈ Γ(A) for all A ∈ B.
Let N be a finite or infinite set, the electorate, whose elements will be
called individuals. The elements of CN will be called profiles. An aggregator
is a map with domain ⊆ CN and range ⊆ C.
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Let A,B ∈ A. We say that an individual i is decisive under an aggregator
F for proposition A if and only if F (P )(A) = Pi(A) for all P in the domain
of F .
The agenda A is said to be C-connected if and only if for all A,B ∈ A,
one can find α, β ∈ [0, 1] and some cylindrical C′ ⊆ C such that there exist
P, P ′ ∈ C′ with P (A) = α and P ′(B) = β, but there is no P ∗ ∈ C′ satisfying
both P ∗(A) = α and P ∗(B) = β. In other words, the agenda is C-connected
if and only if for every pair of propositions one can find a pair of truth-degree
assignments to the propositions and a set of C-admissible constraints which
can be satisfied independently but not jointly.)
An aggregator F is said to preserve unanimity if and only if one has
F (P )(A) = α whenever Pi(A) = α for all i ∈ N . An aggregator F is said to
respect minimal rights if and only if there are at least two individuals that
are decisive under F on at least one proposition each. An aggregator F has
C-universal domain if and only if F : CN → C.
3. Main result
Within this simplified formal framework of probabilistic opinion pooling,
the liberal paradox can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 1. There is no aggregator with C-universal domain respecting
minimal rights and preserving unanimity if and only if A is C-connected.
4. Discussion
In view of the Theorem, there are two natural ways of harmonising
respect for minimal rights with preservation of unanimity. One approach is
to ensure that the agenda in question is not connected given the commonly
shared theory (expressed by the set C of admissible probabilistic judgements).
Suppose one can find at least two propositions in the agenda which are not
connected given the common theory C. Then, in light of our Theorem,
there are aggregators which have universal domain, preserve unanimous
judgements and respect minimal rights.
Alternatively, one may relinquish the assumption of universal domain,
and only allow for profiles where everyone respects the rights of their fellows.
If one restricts the aggregator domain to the set of such profiles (called
“deferring/empathetic” profiles by Dietrich and List [2]), one can easily
construct aggregators that preserve unanimity and respect rights.
As our initial motivating example (involving experts on different
diagnoses) shows, there are situations where deferral is impossible because
one of the propositions falls within the scope of competency of multiple
experts. In such cases, a modification of either the agenda A or the
commonly accepted theory C appears to be the only possibility for enabling
rational aggregation. In the said example, one might exclude the commonly
accepted theoretical assertion (about the comparative effectiveness of drug
D across diagnoses) from the agenda, counting their testimonies as evidence
against that theoretical statement. Simultaneous respect for expert rights
and unanimity requires careful phrasing of the collective decision problem.
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5. Proof
The proof is elementary, as in Sen [7] and Dietrich and List [2].
Proof. “⇐”. Let A be C-connected, and suppose there were some
aggregator F with C-universal domain which respects minimal rights and
preserves unanimity. Let i, j ∈ N and A,B such that under F , i is decisive
on A and j is decisive on B. The agenda being connected, we can find
α, β ∈ [0, 1], some cylindrical C′ and P, P ′ ∈ C′ such that P (A) = α and
P ′(B) = β, while there is no P ∗ ∈ C′ satisfying both P ∗(A) = α and
P ∗(B) = β. Consider now any profile P that satisfies
Pi = P, Pj = P
′, ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} Pk ∈ {P, P ′}.
Since F has C-universal domain, P is in the domain of F . By the choice of
C′, there is a subset B ⊆ A and some Γ : B :→ 2[0,1] such that C′ is the set
of all Q ∈ C satisfying Q(C) ∈ Γ(C) for all C ∈ B. In particular, Pi(C) ∈
{P (C), P ′(C)} ⊆ Γ(C) for all i ∈ N and all C ∈ B. Since F preserves
unanimity, it follows that F (P )(C) ∈ Γ(C) for all C ∈ B whence F (P ) ∈ C′.
On the other hand, by the choice of i, j, A,B as witnesses of the aggregator’s
respect for minimal rights, we have F (P )(A) = Pi(A) = P (A) = α and
F (P )(B) = Pj(B) = P
′(B) = β. Hence P ∗ = F (P ) yields some P ∗ ∈ C′
such that P ∗(A) = α and P ∗(B) = β, contradiction.
“⇒”. Now suppose A is not C-connected. We have to construct some
F : CN → C which respects minimal rights and preserves unanimity.
Consider any P ∈ CN . In order to construct F (P ), let BP ⊆ A be the
set of all propositions on which all Pi agree, i.e.
BP =
{
C ∈ A : ∃γP ,C ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ N Pi(C) = γP ,C
}
,
and let ΓP : B→ 2[0,1] be such that
∀C ∈ BP ∀i ∈ N {Pi(C)} = ΓP (C).
(In other words, ΓP (C) is the singleton containing γP ,C .)
Let C′P be the set of all P ∈ C which satisfy P (C) ∈ ΓP (C) for all C ∈ B.
By our choice of BP and ΓP this means that C′ is the set of all P ∈ C which
adopt the consensus of P whenever there is one: C′P is the set of all P ∈ C
that satisfy
(1) ∀γ ∈ [0, 1] ∀C ∈ A ((∀i ∈ N Pi(C) = γ)⇒ P (C) = γ)
If we construct F in such a way that F (P ) ∈ C′P for all P ∈ CN , it will
preserve unanimity.
Since A is not connected, there are A,B ∈ A such that for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]
and all cylindrical C′ ⊆ C the following holds: If there are P, P ′ ∈ C′ with
P (A) = α and P ′(B) = β, then there is some P ∗ ∈ C′ satisfying both
P ∗(A) = α and P ∗(B) = β.
Fix such A,B ∈ A, and for an arbitrary P ∈ CN let C′ = C′P . Given any
j, k ∈ N , choose α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that Pj(A) = α and Pk(B) = β. Clearly
Pj , Pk ∈ C′P . Thus, there is some P ∗P ∈ C′P satisfying both P ∗P (A) = α
and P ∗P (B) = β. Define F (P ) = P
∗
P . Then by Equation (1), F preserves
unanimity, and it preserves minimal rights, j being decisive for A and k
being decisive for B.
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